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Piagetian scholars have argued that cognitive development is fostered by peer social interaction, 
brought about by ‘socio‐cognitive conflict’ between conserver‐non‐conserver pairs. The 
nonconservers often attain conservation after having discussed their different opinions with 
conserving peers, whereas the conservers do not regress to non conservation. These results are 
generally taken to indicate the beneficial impact of such peer interaction. 
 
In this research, carried out with one sample in the United States and one in the Soviet Union, 
socio‐cognitive conflict was engendered between pairs of 5–7 year‐olds who were differentiated 
by their level of thinking about a mathematical balance beam. Contrary to the results reported by 
the Piagetians, regression was found to be at least as likely as development. The results are 
discussed in terms of differences between research in the domain of conservation and research in 
a related domain in which children's levels of thinking and degree of confidence are not 
confounded. 
 




Researchers working in the Piagetian tradition have, over the course of the last fifteen years, 
examined the effects of peer social interaction on the cognitive development of the participants. 
They have argued that this type of interaction has beneficial consequences for the less advanced 
children and does not adversely effect those who are more advanced (for example, Ames & 
Murray, 1982; Bearison, Magzamen, & Filardo, 1986; Damon, 1984; Doise & Mugny, 1984; 
Murray, 1982; Perret-Clermont, 1980). 
 
To what extent are those uniformly beneficial findings a result of the type of task most often 
used by these researchers? Because their theoretical perspective is derived from Piaget, the most 
commonly used task is from the domain of conservation; conservation of number, or liquid, or 
spatial perspective-taking. The basic form that the research has taken is as follows. Children 
(generally between the ages of five and seven) are pretested, individually, to determine whether 
they have yet attained conservation. In the experimental phase, pairs of children work at the 
same task. For example, a child who does not have conservation of liquid is paired with one who 
does. The children agree that two beakers hold identical amounts of liquid, and then see liquid 
from one beaker poured into another of different dimension. The children are then asked to 
decide, jointly, whether the liquid in the third beaker holds the same amount. Argument between 
the conserver (who holds that the amounts are the same) and the nonconserver (who does not) 
generally results in the nonconserver attaining conservation (Murray, 1982). The effects are not 
temporary, moreover; researchers who have included a second posttest have reported that the 
former nonconservers continue to provide conservation responses up to a month later (Ames & 
Murray, 1982; Robert & Charbonneau, 1977, 1978; Silverman & Geiringer, 1973; Silverman & 
Stone, 1972). Equally importantly, the initially conserving partners do not regress. 
 
The mechanism driving cognitive development is held to be ‘socio-cognitive conflict’ brought 
about by discussion between peers who bring different perspectives to bear on the task. Piaget 
(1926, 1928, 1977) held that this type of discussion is one way in which children learn to ‘de-
center’; the ability to hold two variables in mind simultaneously is necessary for conservation. 
(For more discussion in Piaget’s views on the effects of social interaction on development see 
Tudge and Rogoff, in press.) 
 
Some scholars have argued that the effective mechanism promoting development has nothing to 
do with cognitive conflict, but relates to imitation of a model who has provided the correct 
answer (Rosenthal & Zimmerman, 1972, 1978; Zimmerman & Lanaro, 1974). In other words, 
the crucial factor is not discussion based on a difference of perspectives, as the Piagetians 
argued, but rather observation and imitation. Unlike the Piagetian theoretical position, which 
predicts that development is the most likely result of discussion, scholars in the social learning 
tradition argue that change can occur in any direction, depending upon what is being observed. 
 
To test this hypothesis, Zimmerman and his collegues paired conservers with adults who 
provided nonconservation responses. If imitation of a model is the crucial factor, they argued, the 
conservers should regress. This is precisely what happened. However, the children may have 
accepted the adult’s position primarily because of the social pressure resulting from their unequal 
power relations. The work of Donaldson (1978), Light (1986; Light & Perret-Clermont, in press) 
certainly gives credence to the view that adults can detract from a child’s peformance solely by 
the type of questioning used in the experimental situation. The crucial measure in the case of the 
conservers who regressed would be an assessment of whether they continued to provide 
nonconservation responses when the adult was no longer present. Unfortunately, as Zimmerman 
and his colleagues had not used posttest measures, it was impossible to assess the stability of the 
regression. By contrast, Robert and Charbonneau (1977, 1978) reported that regression by 
conservers occurred only in the presence of adult modelers and was a temporary phenomenon; 
children who regressed reverted to conservation soon after, thus supporting the view that the 
initial regression was solely a response to social pressure. Research designed explicitly to 
compare the effectiveness of socio-cognitive conflict and observation of a model has supported 
the Piagetian position-that socio-cognitive conflict drives development and that regression is at 
worst a temporary phenomenon (Ames & Murray, 1982; Weinstein & Bearison, 1985). 
 
A second interpretation of the Piagetian results is they do not apply to the effects of peer social 
interaction in general but only to one type of interaction, interaction between an expert and a 
novice (Tudge, 1985). Conservers are tantamount to experts, in that they can develop no further 
within that domain of conservation and are highly unlikely to regress in their thinking, given that 
one mark of conservers (at least for Piagetians) is that they are aware of the ‘logical necessity’ of 
their views (Murray, 1982, 1987). The available evidence at least suggests that conservers are 
highly confident of their responses (Miller, 1986; Miller & Brownell, 1975; Miller, Brownell, & 
Zukier, 1977). Conservers are thus unlikely to be swayed by the arguments of nonconservers and 
are therefore unlikely to regress. The “regression” reported by Zimmerman and his colleagues 
(Rosenthal & Zimmerman, 1972, 1978; Zimmerman & Lanaro, 1974) occurred solely in the 
presence of adults who provided incorrect nonconservation responses, and may have been only a 
temporary phenomenon. 
 
Tudge (1985) paired 5-year-olds who differed in their levels of thinking on a mathematical 
balance beam task (Siegler, 1976, 1981), and found that although the less advanced member of a 
pair in some instances was led to advance, in other pairs the more advanced member of the pair 
regressed in his or her thinking. Unlike the results reported by Zimmerman and his colleagues, 
both development and regression were stable phenomena, persisting over the course of 2 
subsequent individual posttests, approximately one week and five weeks after the pairing. 
 
Because children generally do not attain conservation until around the age of six or seven, the 
Piagetian research has been primarily conducted with children somewhat older than those who 
participated in Tudge’s (1985) research. It is thus possible that these results, which run counter to 
those reported by the Piagetians, can be explained by the relative youth of the sample; namely 
that the children’s thinking at this age is more susceptible to regression than at a later age. The 
study presented here is an extension of the 1985 research, using children aged between five and 






Of the 84 five- to seven-year-olds who participated in this study, 42 (17 girls and 25 boys, mean 
age 6 years 3 months, SD 7.7 months) were from a public elementary school in Ithaca, New 
York, and 42 (17 girls and 25 boys, mean age 6 years 4 months, SD 9.2 months) were from a 
state-run kindergarten in Moscow, USSR. Three children in Moscow left school before the 
posttest was administered. The Ithaca subjects were part of a larger sample and were chosen 
from that group so as to match the characteristics of the Moscow sample in terms of the 
children’s initial stage of reasoning about the experimental task, their ages, and (where possible) 




A mathematical balance beam was used (see Figure I), similar to that employed by Siegler in his 
extensive research on the development of rule-based thinking in children (Siegler, 
1976,1978,1981; Siegler & Klahr, 1982). This task was used because is allows for greater 
differentiation of cognitive level than is the case with conservation, because each level requires 
thinking that deals with the relevant variables in a more sophisticated way than previous levels, 
and because no children of the age of interest were likely to be ‘experts’. Moreover, the more 
sophisticated levels require that children take two variables into account simultaneously, as is the 
case with conservation. 
 
The beam had eight removable sticks placed at equal distances from the central fulcrum, and was 
held stable by wooden blocks supporting it at both ends. The blocks were removable to allow the 
children to observe free movement of the beam at the start of the experiment, but thereafter 
remained in place. Metal nuts which fitted over the sticks were used as the weights in the pretest 
and two posttests. In the treatment, when the children were paired, the content of the task was 
similar but the form was different; the sticks were replaced by clear plastic beakers and the 
weights were replaced by identical plastic figures which were placed into the beakers. This was 
done so that the participants would be less tempted to ‘remember’ configurations they had seen 
in the previous session (in fact configurations were not repeated), as well as to discover whether 
solutions to the problems generated in response to one type of visual array would generalize to a 
different type of array. The actual configurations were taken, with minor variations, from those 
used in Siegler’s (1981) research. In each session there were 14 different configurations, varying 
by number of weights and distance from the fulcrum. In each case, the weights were placed on 
only one stick on each side of the fulcrum, with a maximum of six weights on any one side and a 
maximum of ten on both sticks. 
 
Assignment to rule 
 
Siegler (1981) identified four basic ‘rules’ (and one variant) which children used to predict the 
movement of a balance beam when different numbers of weights are placed at varying distances 
from the fulcrum. During pilot testing, however, it became obvious that finer degrees of 
differentiation were possible. Seven rules can be identified, ranging from a reliance totally on 
guesswork (no identifiable rule is used at all) to the ability to predict precisely what will happen 
when any configuration of weights is placed on the beam. 
 
1. Rule 0. No understanding either of the idea of balance or of what will happen when one side 
of the beam has more weights. Children using this rule did not participate further. 
2. Rule 1. No understanding of the idea of simple balance, but a belief that the beam will tip to 
the side with the greater number of weights. Children using this rule only attend to the 
dimension of weight, and can therefore predict with confidence all configurations in which 
one side of the beam had more weights. However they are uncertain when the number of 
weights is identical. 
3. Rule 2. A belief that the beam will tip to the side with the greater number of weights, and 
that it will balance when the number of weights are equal. Children using this rule attend 
only to the dimension of weight, and can predict with confidence all configurations. 
4. Rule 3. A belief that the beam will tip to the side with the greater number of weights. Where 
the weights are equal some attention is paid to distance from the fulcrum, but not in 
consistent fashion. For children using this rule confident predictions can be made when one 
side of the beam has a greater number of weights; when the number is identical and the 
distance from the fulcrum is different there is uncertainty. 
5. Rule 4. The variables of distance and weight can be considered simultaneously. Distance is 
consistently treated as an important variable, but only when the number of weights are equal. 
In other cases, there is a belief that the beam will tip to the side with the greater number of 
weights. For children using this rule all configurations can be predicted with confidence. 
6. Rule 5. Distance is viewed as an important variable even when the number of weights is 
different. However, there is no means of ascertaining precisely under which conditions 
greater distance but fewer weights will overrule lesser distance but more weights; confident 
predictions cannot be made when children are presented with configurations of this type. 
7. Rule 6. An understanding of what will happen in each configuration is gained by multiplying 
the number of weights by the distance from the fulcrum. All configurations can be predicted 
with confidence. No children used this rule. 
 
Each session (the pretest, treatment, and both posttests) was audiotaped, and the experimenter 
and a second coder determined which rule each child used in that session. This was determined 
by the pattern of predications for the fourteen configurations. Inter-rater reliability of assignment 
to rule was never less than 0.92 for the pretest, treatment and posttests. When there were 
disagreements the protocols were rescored blind by both coders and discussed until 
disagreements were resolved. The outcome measure of development (improvement or decline) 
was the difference between the rule used at the time of the pretest and the rule used at the time of 




Pretest: Having spent several days in each classroom, the experimenter (male, English- and 
Russian-speaking) explained and demonstrated the working of the apparatus to each child, 
individually, after which 14 configurations (different numbers of weights at different distances 
from the fulcrum) were presented. The number of weights and degree of distance varied 
systematically so as to exemplify each of the six types of configurations used by Siegler (1976, 
1981). The child was asked to guess whether the beam would stay balanced or tip one way or the 
other if the supports were removed (they never were removed), and to justify that prediction. 
 
Treatment: The treatment phase occurred at least two days after pretesting in each class (mean 
3.87 days in Ithaca, SD 1.37; mean 3.52 days in Moscow, SD 1.60). Participants were assigned to 
one of four treatment conditions: 
 
1. A control group, in which subjects had no partner, and were always tested individually; 
2. An ‘equal rule’ group, in which each child was paired with another child who, in the pretest, 
had used the same rule as themselves; 
3. ‘Lower partners’ group, in which each child was paired with another child who, in the 
pretest, had used a higher rule; 
4. ‘Higher partners’ group, in which each child was paired with another child who, in the 
pretest had used a lower rule. Assignment to treatment condition was random, except that 
pairs were of the same sex and school class. 
 
Members of pairs took turn to be the first to predict each configuration. When a disagreement 
occurred about the prediction the children were asked to explain their reasons to one another and 
reach agreement on one prediction. At this point, the experimenter moved out of obvious earshot, 
returning when the children had reached agreement. 
 
Posttest: The children were again tested individually, to determine whether or not there had been 
any change in their rule use two days after the treatment (mean 2.68 days in Ithaca, SD 2.22; 
mean 2.43 days in Moscow, SD 0.91). A second posttest was given, to determine the stability of 
any changes that might have taken place at least four weeks after the first posttest (mean 32.65 
days in Ithaca, SD 4.12; mean 29.11 days in Moscow, SD 1.36). Stability was assessed from the 





The Piagetian model would predict that lower partners and higher partners would both benefit 
from interaction; neither lower nor higher partners had reached their developmental ceiling, and 
both had experienced socio-cognitive conflict. Because both lower and higher partners had the 
opportunity to discuss the different perspectives they brought to the task they should have done 
better from the interaction than the equal rule partners (who, by virtue of the fact that they used 
identical rules at the time of the pretest, did not bring different perspectives to bear) and the 
individual (control group) children, who did not have any opportunity for discussion. 
 
One member of each pair (chosen at random) was included in the analyses, to allow 
independence of the unit of analysis. Analyses of variance were run, to determine whether the 
types of pairing made a difference in subsequent individual performance, and whether these 
effects varied by culture, age, or gender. The dependent variables were the changes from the rule 
used at the time of the pretest to the rule med at the treatment, first posttest, and second posttest. 
A change of rule use to the next higher was given a score of 1, a decline of two rules given a 
score of -2, and so on. The results did not differ by culture or age or any interaction of them with 
treatment group. For this reason, the data were collapsed across age and culture, and I will focus 
on the effects of type of pairing and gender. 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, the main effect of treatment condition was significant at the time of 
the treatment, first posttest, and (Ithaca data only) second posttest. The most striking factor is the 
amount of regression that occurred. Interaction, far from being uniformly beneficial, was harmful 
for all children except those who were lower partners. That is, on average, children fared worse 
from interacting with a partner whose initial level of thinking was lower than their own. The fact 
that the higher partners declined most, on average, is particularly striking as it runs counter to the 
Piagetian model of the effects of social interaction on cognitive development. The only children 
who improved in their thinking were the lower partners, those paired with a child who had used a 
higher rule at the time of the pretest. 
 
Some of this change from one rule to another may be attributable to regression artifacts-higher 
partners had, on average, necessarily used a higher rule at the time of the pretest than the lower 
partners. But it should be noted that higher partners did not exclusively use the highest rules. A 
rule 2 user, paired with a child who used rule 1, would be a higher partner; a rule 4 user, paired 
with a child who used rule 5, would be a lower partner. Lower partners, on average, improved 
their pretest scores, whereas higher partners, on average, declined, irrespective of how high or 
low their initial scores were. 
 
Table 1. Mean cognitive change from pretest, by condition (1 member of each pair) 
 Mean SD N 
Individuals    
treatment –0.05 .51 20 
1st posttest –0.20 .62 20 
2nd posttest 0 .86 9 
Equal rule pairs    
treatment –0.36 .74 14 
1st posttest –0.14 .53 14 
2nd posttest –0.43 .79 7 
Lower partners    
treatment 0.90 .57 10 
1st posttest 0.80 .92 10 
2nd posttest 1.0 .71 5 
Higher partners    
treatment –0.37 1.19 8 
1st posttest –0.62 .92 8 
2nd posttest –0.67 .58 3 
The independent main effect of type of pairing in a 4 (condition) X 2 (gender) ANOVA: 
Treatment F3,44 = 12.20, p <0 .0001 
1st posttest F3,44 = 8.79, p <0 .0001 
2nd posttest F3,16 = 4.43, p <0.02 (Ithaca sample only) 
 
There was also a significant interaction of condition by gender at the time of the treatment (F3,36 
= 8.42, p <0.001), first posttest (F3,36 = 4.11, p < 0.02), and (Ithaca data only) second posttest 
(F3,16 = 3.29, p < 0 .05). This was caused almost exclusively by the very poor performance of 
three higher partner girls from Ithaca. (I should emphasize that the main effect of treatment 
group discussed earlier was the effect after the variance attributable to the interaction term was 
accounted for.) 
 
The stability of changes in rule use 
 
The stability of the effects of being paired with no-one, with a peer who used the same rule, or 
with a peer who used either a higher or lower rule, can only be examined in the Ithaca sample, 
which was given a second posttest four weeks after the first. The effects of membership in the 
different treatments were stable, showing only little evidence of reversion to use of the pretest 
rule. Over all Ithaca subjects, the Pearson correlation coefficients between first and second 
posttest were as follows: r = .94 (individuals), r = .92 (equal rule condition), r = .79 (lower 
partners), and r = .92 (higher partners). 
 
THE PROCESSES OF CHANGE 
 
So far, I have concentrated on the results of interaction rather than upon the processes involved. 
But it is important to understand the reasons for development or regression, and to provide an 
indication of what actually happened during the collaboration that may be seen as exerting a 
causal influence. Two factors appear to be of most significance. The first has to do with the 
amount of confidence each child had in the predictions he or she made. The second has to do 
with the reasoning each child used to support the predictions. 
 
The influence of confidence 
 
It would be a mistake to believe that all lower partners (children paired with a partner who used a 
higher rule) improved; some children in this treatment group did not improve. Similarly, being 
paired with a lower partner or with one who had used the same rule at the time of the pretest did 
not automatically lead to decline. To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to refer to 
the nature of the rules. 
 
Two rules (rules 2 and 4) can be characterized as allowing certainty of prediction, for they allow 
a child to apply that rule to all configurations of weights and distances. For example, a rule 2 
user (one who believes simply that equal numbers of weights will result in balance, and that 
when the beam has unequal numbers of weights it will tip to the side with the greatest number) 
can apply that rule equally to all problems presented. Rules 1, 3, and 5, however, necessarily 
incorporate some degree of uncertainty when thinking about certain types of configurations. A 
rule 5 user, for example, believes that weight and distance have to be considered, but has no 
means to judge what will happen when on one side of the beam fewer weights are placed at a 
greater distance from the fulcrum. As Siegler (1976, 1981) pointed out, for these types of 
configurations guessing is the only solution. 
 
As Table 2 shows, approximately twice as many children who had used a ‘confident’ rule at the 
time of the pretest continued to use that rule as did those children who had used a rule that 
incorporated some uncertainty, irrespective of type of pairing. Children whose rule did not 
encourage confidence of prediction were likely to improve if they were paired with a higher 
partner whose rule allowed confident predictions, but they were likely to decline if their partner’s 
rule was lower than their own but was one which allowed confidence of prediction. 
 
Table 2. The influence of type of rule used (percentage of children regressing, not moving, or 
improving) 
 Treatment  
 Rules 2 and 4 (n = 32) Rules 1, 3, and 5 (n = 20) 
Improve 17.7 35.0 
No move 68.7 30.0 
Regress 12.5 35.0 
Chi square (2) = 7.68, p <0.02  
 1st possttest  
 Rules 2 and 4 (n = 32) Rules 1, 3, and 5 (n = 20) 
Improve 9.4 25.0 
No move 78.1 45.0 
Regress 12.5 25.0 
Chi square (2) = 5.98, p = 0.05  
 
This lack of confident prediction associated with certain of the rules explains why some 
individuals and some children in the equal rule group declined. Virtually all who did so had used 
a rule which did not allow confidence about all predictions; they were highly likely to drop to the 
rule immediately below, in effect trading cognitive sophistication for an increase in certainty. 
 
An example of this process is taken from 2 girls, aged six. Van. had used rule 2 at the time of the 
pretest, predicting simply according to the number of weights and paying no attention to 
distance. Kir., on the other hand, was a rule 3 user. When presented with 3 weights on the stick 
second from the fulcrum and 3 on the fourth stick over she picked the side with the weights 
furthest from the fulcrum. Furthermore, she justified her prediction by specifying that it was 
closer to the end. Kir. clearly was not certain of the rule played by distance, however, for on 
three other problems of a similar nature she predicted ‘balance’ on the grounds that there was the 
same number on either side. When paired, 5 days later, Van. was chosen, at random, to predict 
the first configuration. 4 weights were in the 3rd beaker (clear plastic beakers replaced the sticks 
and identical figures acted as the ‘weights’ during the paired sessions) on the ‘green’ side while 
on the ‘red’ side 2 weights were placed in the 3rd beaker. Van. unhesitatingly picked the green 
side, as did Kir. For the second problem Kir. went first. 2 weights were in the 2nd beaker on the 
green side, 4 were in the 1st beaker on the red side. Kir. predicted that the red side would tip, and 
Van. agreed. Both children had justified their answers by referring to number of weights, and 
both predications were those expected of both rule 2 and rule 3 users. 
 
The third problem was the first on which Kir. might have been expected to mention the 
importance of distance. 3 weights were in the 3rd beaker on the green side and 3 were in the 4th 
beaker on the red side. However, Van. went first and predicted ‘balance,’ and Kir. followed her 
lead. Neither her tone nor her words were particularly confident, however: ‘I think it will stay 
balanced, kind of.’ Kir. also followed Van’s lead in her subsequent justification: ‘Because there’s 
3 on both sides.’ The next 2 problems were those on which agreement was expected; it was duly 
forthcoming. The 6th problem was, in retrospect, crucial. On the green side 1 weight was in the 
1st beaker, while on the red side 1 weight was in the 4th beaker. Kir. made the first prediction:  
 
Kir.: Hmmmm . . . let’s see . . . maybe it would balance, I’m not sure. Maybe. 
Exp.: Why aren’t you sure? 
Kir.: Because . . . this is way up here and that’s way up there. I mean it’s way down there 
and that’s all the way up here. 
(Van. laughs at this point.) 
Kir.: So it would . . . I don’t know what side it would tip over on. 
Exp.: You’re not sure? OK 
Van.: I think it would stay . . . 
Exp.: Which side would you, if you Just had to make one guess, if I pulled the blocks 
away now, what side would you guess it would, or what would you guess would happen? 
Kir.: Uh, I think it would balance. 
Exp.: What do you think? 
Van.: I think it would stay balanced. 
Exp.: OK, why do you think it would stay balanced, Kir.? 
Kir.: Because there’s one on that side and one on this side. 
Exp.: OK, why do you think it would stay balanced, Van.? 
Van.: One on that side and one on that side. 
 
What the transcripts cannot adequately indicate is the hesitation in Kir.’s voice, and Van.’s fast, 
confident answers. Faced with her own lack of certainty, and her partner’s clear confidence that 
only number of weights was important, Kir. adopted that view, and for the remaining 
configurations simply mentioned number of weights. 
 
It is quite possible, of course, that in the social situation in which her partner is making a 
different prediction to the one Kir. was tempted to make she just went along with Van., perhaps 
not wanting to argue. When conservers are led to agree with adults who provide nonconservation 
answers, there is some justification for believing that the children are simply acceding to the 
adult, for when retested later (individually) they simply revert to conservation responses (Robert 
& Charbonneau, 1977, 1978). In the present instance, however, the regression was not 
temporary. When tested individually 2 days following the paired session, Kir. made her 
predictions solely on the basis of number of weights. And one month later, at the time of the 
second individual posttest, she continued to refer only to the number of weights in making her 
predictions. 
 
The influence of the quality of reasoning 
 
The second important factor relating to the process of reasoning is the type of reasoning the 
partners used. In the course of the interactions, whenever the partners disagree in their 
predications discussion (or socio-cognitive conflict) ensued. In the course of this discussion, each 
partner used arguments to justify his or her prediction about the movement of the beam. The type 
of reasoning to which each partner was exposed could be below his or her initial level of 
thinking (as reflected in the pretest rule used), at the same level, or above. 
 
Table 3. Mean change from pretest, by quality of reasoning 
 Mean SD N 
Lower reasoning    
treatment –0.83 .98 6 
1st posttest –0.33 1.03 6 
2nd posttest –0.67 .58 3 
Same level reasoning    
treatment –0.07 .80 15 
1st posttest –0.20 .68 15 
2nd posttest –0.25 .50 4 
Higher reasoning    
treatment 1.00 .50 9 
1st posttest 0.78 .97 9 
2nd posttest 0.83 .75 6 
The independent main effect of type of pairing in a 4 (condition) X 2 (gender) ANOVA: 
Treatment F2,27 = 11.07, p <0.001 
1st posttest F2,27 = 4.60, p <0 .05 
2nd posttest F2,10 = 6.40, p <0.05 (Ithaca sample only) 
 
The effect of the quality of reasoning was striking. When this factor was added to the model, the 
main effects of condition, culture, and gender were not significant; neither were the interaction 
terms. The data were therefore collapsed across treatment group, culture, and gender. This 
revealed that the influence of reasoning at the time of the interaction itself had a powerful effect 
upon the partner’s thinking and any change induced at that time was very likely to remain in 
effect during the individual posttests. As Table 3 shows, children who were exposed to reasoning 
at a higher level were overwhelmingly likely to begin to use a higher rule. Children who heard 
reasoning at the same level as their own pretest rule were likely to continue to use that same rule. 
Children who heard reasoning at a lower level either continued to use the same rule or regressed 
to a lower rule. 
 
As might be expected, the children were most likely to hear reasoning at a higher level if they 
were paired with a child who had used a higher rule at the time of the pretest, although there was 
no one-to-one correspondence. Of the 9 children who heard reasoning at a higher level during the 
course of the interaction, 7 were paired with a child who had used a higher rule. Similarly, 9 of 
15 children hearing reasoning at the same level had been paired with a partner who had used the 
same rule, while 4 of 6 children hearing reasoning at a lower level had been paired with a partner 
who had used a lower rule. 
 
By ‘hearing reasoning at a higher level’ I mean the child’s partner presenting arguments in the 
course of the discussion which were more cognitively sophisticated than those of the child under 
consideration. For example, in the session described above, Kir. indicated in one of her responses 
that distance might be an important factor: ‘It’s [the one weight on the green side] way down 
there and that’s [the single weight on the red side] all the way up here.’ In that instance, she was 
not convinced that distance has a bearing on the problem, and quickly shifted to a consideration 
solely of number of weights. In other cases, however, a rule 4 user, paired with a rule 2 user, 
would make a strong case for the effects of distance. Two kindergartners, Jes. (who used rule 4) 
and All. (a rule 2 user) disagreed on a problem in which 3 weights were on the 3rd beaker on the 
green side and 3 were on the 4th beaker on the red side. Jes., who went first, predicted that the 
red side would tip. Al. justified her answer by saying: ‘I think it would stay balanced because 
there’s 3 in each cup.’ Jes. responded: ‘I think it would tip to the red side because this one is 
farther over . . . than that one,’ whereupon Al. quickly accepted that view: ‘I think so.’ 
 
It must be pointed out that being presented with arguments embodying a more sophisticated 
cognitive rule did not necessarily lead to an understanding of that rule, even if the partner’s view 
was accepted at the time of the pairing. In the case of Jes. and All., for example, despite the fact 
that All. accepted her partner’s point of view she did not use the higher form of reasoning during 
subsequent posttests. Nevertheless, as is clear from Table 3, by and large children who were 
exposed to more cognitively sophisticated reasoning at the time of pairing were by far the most 
likely to use that higher level of thinking during the posttests. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Piagetians who have examined the effects of social interaction on cognitive development have 
argued that socio-cognitive conflict in the course of discussion between peers leads to 
development. The data they present are persuasive, for in many studies nonconservers are led to 
attain conservation in the course of discussion with conserving peers. The interaction is not only 
beneficial for the nonconservers; it has no deleterious effects upon their conserving partners. In 
fact, regression of conservers appear to occur solely in specifiable contexts (when a child is faced 
with an adult who provides incorrect answers) and even then the regression is short-lived. 
 
However, in research in which a conserver and a nonconserver discuss a conservation task, 
expertise and interaction are necessarily confounded. One way of teasing apart these 
confounding variables is to pair a nonconserver with a ‘partial conserver’-a child who has 
progressed further than a nonconserver but has yet to show full appreciation of the logical status 
of conservation-or two nonconservers who differ in their understanding of the task. The results in 
these cases have been inconsistent, however; in some cases nonconservers have advanced 
(Perret-Clermont, 1980; Weinstein & Bearison, 1985), while in othrs they have not (Russell, 
1982). 
 
The primary motivation for the research reported here was thus to examine the effectiveness of 
peer social interaction in a situation other than conservation and in which the more advanced 
member of a pair was not an expert at the tast to be solved. The balance beam task is similar to 
tasks used by Piagetians; children using rules 1 and 2 are only able to take one variable into 
account at once (the number of weights), whereas children using rules 3 to 5 are able to take two 
variables into account in increasingly sophisticated ways. The parallels with conservation are 
clear. Moreover, just as in research pairing conservers with noncnservers, in which the children 
receive no independent confirmation of their opinions, the participants in the balance beam 
research did not find out whether their predictions were correct. The main differences were 
crucial; that even the most advanced children were not expert, and they did not (unlike 
conservers) have any sense that their views were ‘logically necessary.’ 
 
Under these conditions, the Piagetian model that stresses the benefits of socio-cognitive conflict 
for later development is not supported. In fact, the reverse is true; children whose thinking was at 
a more advanced level than their partner actually regressed in their thinking as a result of socio-
cognitive conflict. This regression, moreover, was a stable phenomenon; changes in thinking at 
the time of the interaction between partners were very likely to remain in effect over the course 
of two individual posttests several days and several weeks after the paired session. Regression 
also occurred for many of the children paired with a child whose initial level of reasoning was 
the same. The group of lower partners (children paired with a partner who had used a higher 
level of thinking at the time of the pretest) was the only group to benefit from interaction; their 
development was as stable as the regression of the children in the two other groups in which 
children were paired. 
 
The implication of these findings is that the exclusively beneficial influence of social interaction 
on cognitive development that has been reported by the Piagetian scholars may not generalize 
beyond those situations in which the more advanced partner is akin to an expert-both 
knowledgeable and confident. In other situations, in which the more advanced child still has 
room for development and in which she does not necessarily feel more confident of her opinions, 
the question of who is likely to convince whom remains open. Socio-cognitive conflict, in this 
situation, appears at least as likely to lead to regression as to development. 
 
Virtually identical findings were obtained in the two sub-samples (Moscow and Ithaca) 
comprising this research. Some differences were noted, however. In Ithaca, boys tended to fare 
much better (in terms of improvement from pretest and posttests) than girls, who were more 
likely to regress, whereas in Moscow these gender differences were not found. In both sub-
samples the pairs were same-gender pairs, so it was not the case that boys benefitted at the 
expense of girls. One speculation (Tudge, 1986) is that in the United States boys are socialized to 
think of themselves as more adept at scientific or mathematical tasks than girls, and that they 
were therefore more motivated by the task. In the USSR, on the other hand, girls are not brought 
up to think of themselves as inferior to boys in this sphere. Alternatively, if it is the case that 
American girls are socialized to be more ‘affiliative’(Gilligan, 1982), it is possible that they were 
more ready to agree with their partners solely to remain friends, even if that meant taking a less 
sophisticated cognitive position. The number of subjects used in this research is hardly large 
enough to place much weight on the gender differences found in the two cultures. 
 
Despite the amount of regression that was found in this study, it would be wrong to assume that 
social interaction among peers in the course of problem-solving necessarily has negative 
consequences for all children other than those working with a more advanced partner. In order to 
allow a meaningful comparison with the Piagetian research, feedback to the children could not 
be provided. In other words, they could not discover whether their predictions were correct. In 
many problem-solving situation, however, particularly in school, children working on tasks do 
receive feedback. They find out whether their solutions to problems were correct. In a study in 
which children worked in pairs on the balance beam but received feedback after each prediction, 
regression was not found (Tudge, 1987, in press). The effects of feedback were so powerful, in 
fact, that children without a partner improved as much as those who were able to engage in social 
interaction. However, ceiling effects may have masked the effectiveness of interaction, a 
hypothesis that is currently under investigation by the author. 
 
In any event, it seems clear that any model of the relationship between peer collaboration and 
cognitive development must take into account the processes of interaction themselves, in 
particular the nature of the information being provided (whether at a lower or higher level of 
thinking), the confidence with which opinions are held, and whether or not the children receive 
feedback. The simpler Piagetian model, which portrays social interaction as being exclusively 
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